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Proportionality Review in Administrative Law
Jud Mathews1
(forthcoming in Comparative Administrative Law, second edition (Peter
Lindseth, Susan Rose-Ackerman & Blake Emerson, eds.),
Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2017.)
1. Introduction
At the most basic level, the principle of proportionality captures the
common-sensical proposition that, when the government acts, the
means it chooses should be well-adapted to achieve the ends it is
pursuing. The proportionality principle is an admonition, as German
administrative law scholar Fritz Fleiner famously wrote many decades
ago, that “the police should not shoot at sparrows with cannons”
(Fleiner 1928, 404). Courts instantiate the principle through a form of
review that typically passes a challenged legal measure through a
prescribed sequence of increasingly stringent legal tests, in order to
determine whether the measure in fact impinges disproportionately on
the rights or interests of a party.
The global spread of proportionality is one of the worst-kept secrets in
comparative law. As proportionality has become a fixture in numerous
national and international legal regimes over the past few decades
(Stone Sweet and Mathews 2008), it has also attracted a substantial
amount of scholarly attention, and more than a little criticism.2 But the
lion’s share of attention has focused on the use of proportionality in
the realm of constitutional law, as a technique for adjudicating
constitutional rights claims. Scholars have also given substantial
consideration to the use of proportionality in regimes of public
international law and and international investment law (Baade et al.
2016; Bücheler 2015). Less has been said about proportionality’s role
within administrative law. In fact, proportionality has also come to play
a significant role in the administrative law of a large and diverse set of
jurisdictions as a control on administrative discretion, even when
constitutional rights are not in play.
If the use of proportionality review in administrative law is widespread,
it is also characterized by significant national differences. This chapter
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aims to survey that diversity, and to help make sense of it, by
organizing it and offering hypotheses about some of the sources of the
variation that we observe. I draw on examples from several
jurisdictions, but I do not claim that this account is remotely
comprehensive or definitive.3 The use of proportionality review in
administrative law is a topic that deserves more thorough and
systematic study.4 Further empirical work would permit, among other
things, testing of the hypotheses tentatively offered in this chapter.
Proportionality in administrative law is something of a moving target,
as changes are ongoing in many legal systems. Still, I suggest that we
can understand the differences in how proportionality is used in the
administrative law of different jurisdictions in terms of three principal
axes of variation. With respect to any jurisdiction, we can ask:
•   how extensive the use of proportionality is (for instance, is
proportionality applied haphazardly, or only in a few settings,
or is it a general head of review that applies in principle to all
administrative actions?),
•   how intensive the application of proportionality is (for instance,
does proportionality entail serious judicial scrutiny, or
substantial deference, or does it amount in practice to a lowintensity reasonableness review?), and
•   how discursive proportionality review is within the jurisdiction
(for instance, do courts treat proportionality as a framework for
reasoned justification, through which they explain their way to
a conclusion in light of the relevant factors, or is the conclusion
that a measure is proportional presented as an ipse dixit?)
Ultimately, I argue, we can resolve some of the cross-national
variety that we see into intelligible patterns, at which point some
underlying regularities in how proportionality is used begin to emerge.
To be sure, the diversity is very real: not only in formal doctrinal
structures, but even in what actors in different legal systems mean
when they refer to “proportionality” or “balancing” (Bomhoff 2013,
13-21). But it becomes possible to think of proportionality as a master
concept of public law, and to see the differences in how it is
instantiated—within different legal systems, in constitutional versus
administrative law, and in different contexts within administrative
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law—as adaptations to system- and context-specific differences.
The next section discusses the steps of proportionality review,
and its historical origins. The section following describes the three
major axes of variation. The last section assesses differences in how
proportionality is applied, both across and within legal systems, and in
conclusion considers proportionality’s place in public law.

2. Proportionality Review: Elements and Origins
2.1 The Elements of Proportionality Review
What I will call the standard model of proportionality review consists
of three or four steps, depending on who is doing the counting. Courts
inquire successively into the (1) legitimacy, (2) suitability, (3) necessity,
and (4) proportionality stricto sensu—in the strict sense—of a
challenged measure. (In many jurisdictions, the first step is regarded as
a threshold inquiry, rather than a part of the analysis proper).
Suppose, for instance, that the Minister of Transportation issues
regulations banning most heavy goods trucks from highways during
daytime weekend hours. A full-dress review of the measure’s
proportionality might look something like the following. First, as a
preliminary matter, the court would ask whether the challenged
measure serves a legitimate purpose: that is to say, a purpose it is
permissible for the authority in question to pursue. This is a low bar to
pass—it is a serious and rare infirmity for a government measure to
have no legitimate purpose—and few measures are struck down at this
stage. The Ministry should be able to justify the measure as a means to
pursue ends for which it is responsible: reducing road congestion and
improving public safety, for instance.
Next, the court asks whether the challenged measure is a “suitable”
means to the achievement of its purpose. This, too, is a fairly relaxed
inquiry, similar in spirit to the rational basis review conducted by
American courts. To qualify as suitable, a measure need not be the best
possible or most appropriate; it need only make some contribution to
the legitimate purpose already identified. If the Ministry can credibly
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claim that the ban reduces congesting and improves safety, it will pass
this test.
From this point on, proportionality review becomes progressively more
demanding—although in practice, just how demanding can vary quite
a bit. The next question is whether the measure is necessary to achieve
its stated goal. This necessity inquiry is often operationalized as a leastrestrictive means test: in other words, could the government’s purpose
also be achieved by alternative measures that infringe less on the
freedom or interests of others? If the answer is yes, the government’s
action is a disproportionate measure, and hence impermissible.
Whether our putative driving ban would survive this stage of review
depends heavily on how the court conducts it. Least-restrictive means
testing is, in principle, quite an intensive form of judicial scrutiny. But
as discussed further below, courts in different jurisdictions have been
known to modulate the stringency of the inquiry, for instance by
adjusting how much deference they give to government judgments
about the effects and availability of policy alternatives.
If a measure survives the necessity test, it proceeds to the final phase
of the inquiry, a balancing analysis, also known as “proportionality in
the strict sense.” Now the court weighs the benefits of the challenged
measure (which has already been found to be appropriately tailored to
the end it serves) against its costs, in terms of infringements of protected
rights or interests. Only if its benefits exceed the burden it imposes
does the challenged measure survive. Obviously, in this final stage of
the analysis, courts cannot avoid making policy assessments and value
judgments.
2.2 Origins of Proportionality Review
The core idea of proportionality, of course, a very old one. In a
concurrence, Israel’s Supreme Court President Aharon Barak found a
version of the concept in twelfth-century philosopher Moses
Maimonides’ instruction to use stronger medicines only if weaker
medicines fail,5 and has identified still older antecedents in his
scholarly work (Barak 2012). And courts have applied at least some
version of a proportionality test for a long time as well. Paul Craig has
recently unearthed a trove of sixteenth and seventeenth-century
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English cases in which courts apply a “proportionability” standard in a
number of contexts (Craig 2017).
But the modern, multistep proportionality framework is an innovation
of Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court, which has used it to
adjudicate constitutional rights claims for more than half a century.
And the Constitutional Court adapted the concept from German
administrative law, where proportionality has played a role in judicial
control of administrative action since the late nineteenth century. It is
worth taking a very brief trip through proportionality’s origins in
German legal thought and judicial practice, because the original
justifications offered for proportionality as a fundamental legal
principle still resonate today, or so I will suggest later.
The proportionality principle emerged when late-eighteenth
century legal thinkers derived rules to govern the use of police power
in light of first principles of political philosophy. By the late 1700s,
cameralism—the German science of public administration—had
largely accepted the social contractarian premise that state power rests
on an implicit bargain between subjects and sovereign, whereby the
former submit to the rule of the latter so that the sovereign can advance
their common welfare. But if this bargain is the source of the state’s
authority to act, it also sets the outer bounds of the state’s authority:
the state is justified in acting only to the extent that its action promotes
the public welfare. As applied to police law, in the words of jurist
Günther Heinrich von Berg, “the police law may abridge the natural
freedom of the subject, but only insofar as its lawful goal requires.”
If the principle of proportionality was recognized by the end of the
eighteenth century, proportionality review would not develop until
nearly a century later, after administrative acts became subject to
review by courts. The key development here was the establishment in
Prussia of the Supreme Administrative Court (Oberverwaltungsgericht)
in 1875. Within a few years, the court had fashioned the
proportionality principle into a meaningful constraint over
administrative discretion, both by circumscribing the legitimate ends
of the police power, and also by scrutinizing the means chosen in
pursuit of those ends.
Two examples will suffice by way of illustrating the early
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proportionality case law of the Supreme Administrative Court. In an
1886 case, the court ruled that the police could not require, on public
safety grounds, a landowner to remove a post erected at the edge of
his property. Rather, all that was necessary to protect the public was
requiring the landowner to light the post after dark. As the court
explained, “[t]he protection from accidents . . . is indeed the task of
the police; this task and the authority finds its limit, however, in that
the chosen measures may not extends farther than they must to meet
the goal of eliminating the danger.” That same year, the court ruled
that it was disproportionate, and hence, impermissible for the police
to close down a shop in response to the shopowner’s distribution of
brandy without a license. The operation of the shop was itself not
unlawful; only the distribution of brandy was. And so closing the shop
was a more drastic step than the police needed to take to meet the
legitimate goal of enforcing the license requirement.
Other administrative courts within Germany soon began following
Prussia’s lead, striking down police measures on proportionality
grounds (Stern 1993, 168). Though the subjects of imperial Germany
did not enjoy the protection of entrenched constitutional rights,
proportionality did make a significant contribution to individual
freedom and the rule of law, by regularizing the use of state power.

3. Axes of Variation
Today, a form of proportionality review plays at least some role in the
administrative law of many legal systems, but the differences across
jurisdictions are significant. I suggest that administrative law systems
vary along three principal dimensions with respect to their use of
proportionality review.
3.1 Extensiveness of Use
Administrative law systems differ in terms of how extensively they
employ proportionality review. In some systems, proportionality is
regarded as a constitutional or general principle of law that applies, in
principle, to the whole corpus of law. In others, proportionality applies
only to certain areas within administrative law, or crops up
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unpredictably. And of course, some administrative law systems do not
recognize proportionality as a governing legal standard at all.
The European Union and Germany stand at one end of the spectrum,
as jurisdictions in which the proportionality principle counts as
fundamental law. In the European Union, proportionality numbers
among the general principles of EU law, and applies to EU measures
as well as to member state measures alleged to infringe freedoms
guaranteed in EU Treaties (Tridimas 2006, 137-38). Similarly, in
Germany, proportionality counts as a fundamental constitutional
principle, derived from the rule of law, which applies to all acts of the
state that implicate the subjective rights of individuals in any way
(Jarass and Pieroth 2012, 529, 530).6 More recently, South Korea’s
Constitutional Court has identified proportionality as a basic standard
of review (Huang and Law 2014, 13).
Significantly, even in jurisdictions where proportionality applies in
principle to all acts of the state, it does not follow that proportionality
dominates the decisional law of administrative tribunals, providing the
rule of decision in most cases. The array of rules and requirements to
which the administration must conform in a typical jurisdiction tends
to generate a correspondingly wide set of grounds on which to
challenge administrative actions. Moreover, proportionality generally
only comes into play where the administration is authorized to
exercise discretion, and legal systems may recognize grounds for the
substantive review of administrative choices in addition to
proportionality.
Germany illustrates the point. Judicial review may be available of both
regulations (Rechtsverordnungen) and concrete administrative acts
(Verwaltungsakte — enforcement actions, for instance), but legal
challenges to the latter predominate in German administrative law
(Rose-Ackerman 1995, 60). German administrative law has welldeveloped doctrines in place to govern the use of different forms of
discretion by the administration (Marsch and Tünsmeyer 2016, 19-21).
Some administrative choices that could be challenged as
disproportionate grounds would also qualify as a misuse of discretion
(Ermessensfehlgebrauch) and so could be invalidated on that ground
(Maurer 2011, 149-50).7 There are different views among scholars as
to how the proportionality principle relates conceptually to the
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doctrines governing the use of discretion (Alexy 1986). But in
administrative litigation, it seems that proportionality often ends up
functioning as a last line of offense, to be litigated after other lines of
attack against a measure fail, and when they are unavailable.
In other jurisdictions, the use of proportionality has been formally
confined to one or a few areas within administrative law. In England,
for instance, the venerable and deferential Wednesbury standard
continues to govern most administrative decisions. Proportionality,
however, applies to matters decided under EU law or the Human
Rights Act of 1998, which enacted as domestic law rights from the
European Convention on Human Rights (Davies and Williams 2016,
71). In Canada, proportionality informs the reasonableness review of
administrative action insofar as it implicates rights guaranteed under
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Values.8 And even though judicial
review of administrative discretion is extremely limited in China,
proportionality has made some scattered appearances there as well,
including in a decision of the Supreme People’s Court,9 and
significantly, in several lower court cases selected for publication in
the anthology of Guiding Cases, which is edited by the Administrative
Tribunal of Supreme People’s Court (Wang 2013, 14-17). In some
jurisdictions, including Taiwan and South Korea, proportionality has
been taken up unevenly by different high courts (Huang and Law 2014,
13, 21).
The adoption of proportionality in a jurisdiction, even to a limited
extent, sometimes seems to trigger an expansion of proportionality’s
use, or at least calls for such an expansion. Its adoption in the
constitutional context may pave the way for its use in administrative
law (or vice versa). In the years since the adoption of the Human Rights
Act in the UK, a number of scholars there have called for the adoption
of proportionality as a general head of review (Craig 2013, 88 n.24),
and proportionality has in fact made some inroads in administrative
caselaw (Davies and Williams 2016, 80).10 With respect to Canada,
scholars have advanced different arguments to the effect that courts
should more tightly integrate administrative law doctrines and
constitutional law principles, including proportionality (Walters 2015;
Carter 2004). In recent years, proportionality has experienced
increased recognition in a number of Asian jurisdictions, including
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Taiwan, Korea, and Japan as well as China, and may come to play a
still more prominent role in those jurisdictions in years to come (Huang
and Law 2014).
France is a jurisdiction where proportionality has come to be widely
used in a number of areas of administrative law over a period of years
(Sanchez 2016, 43-44). Police measures that infringe on basic
freedoms have long been subject to a form of proportionality review
administered by France’s Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative
tribunal. For instance, in the celebrated Benjamin case from 1933, the
Conseil d’Etat struck down a police measure banning a conference
organized by a controversial political figure, on the grounds that less
restrictive measures would have also preserved the peace.11
Starting in the 1970s, the Conseil d’Etat began assessing urban
planning decisions under the doctrine of le bilan (the balance sheet),
which amounts to a proportionality balancing analysis: the court
compares the advantages and disadvantages of a given plan to
determine whether it is permissible (Brown and Bell 1998, 263).
Proportionality also figures importantly in the review of administrative
penalties in France.12 The Conseil d’Etat also appears to be becoming
more self-conscious is its use of the proportionality concept in recent
years: comparing the years 2001-2005 and 2010-2015, references to
“proportionnalité” in the decisions of the Conseil d'Etat jumped
roughly five-fold, while the volume of decisions overall declined by
more than a third. And notably, France’s Constitutional Council began
explicitly conducting proportionality review on legislation in 2008.13
3.2 Intensity of Application
Applied at full strength, proportionality review sets a very demanding
standard. As mentioned above, its real teeth are to be found in the
penultimate and final steps of the test’s canonical formulation, which
subject the challenged measure to least restrictive means testing and a
form of benefit-cost analysis, respectively. In practice though, there is
substantial variation, across jurisdictions and across contexts, in how
intensively proportionality is applied.
Writing with reference to the Human Rights Act, Cora Chan has
inventoried a number of techniques UK courts have employed to
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soften the stringency of proportionality review. These include: skipping
stages of the analysis or merging it into an omnibus “fair balance” or
“reasonableness” review; granting some measure of deference to the
primary decision maker’s judgment, either of the availability of lessinfringing alternatives or the proportionality of the measure more
broadly; and limiting review to cases of “manifest disproportionality”
(Chan 2013, 9). These techniques appear in other jurisdictions as well,
alongside some others, such as shifting to a measure’s challenger the
burden of demonstrating the availability of less onerous alternatives
(De Búrca 1993, 111-12).
In some jurisdictions, proportionality is rarely if ever applied in a very
demanding form. In China, for example, Jing Wang reports that courts
in China are reluctant to review discretionary decisions with
substantial stringency, even in the rare instances where they are in a
position to invoke proportionality at all (Wang 2013, 18-19).
Elsewhere, courts appear to oscillate between more and less intensive
versions of proportionality with little predictability. Describing the use
of proportionality by Taiwan’s Constitutional Court, Cheng-yi Huang
and David Law write that “the test remains underdeveloped and
inconsistent in application” (Huang and Law 2014, 20). In systems
where proportionality review is well-established, however, courts tend
to vary the scrutiny of review with the context of the case in a moreor-less predictable fashion.
The EU offers a good example. The degree of scrutiny that the Court of
First Instance and the European Court of Justice applies varies across
the range of cases the courts hear, in light of the relative competences
of courts and legislatures and the importance of the issues the courts
are charged to protect (Craig 2006, 657). Judicial scrutiny is at a low
ebb when the courts review discretionary choices that require political,
social, and economic judgments and trade-offs.14 In such cases, the
courts generally overturn only those directives or regulations found to
be “manifestly disproportionate.” The courts tend to be less deferential,
for instance, when reviewing burdens and penalties, which often pose
substantial hardships for the individual challengers and do not usually
implicate the design of broader regulatory programs (Craig 2006,
681).15 A claim that a measure violates an EU right triggers highintensity review (Craig and De Búrca 2011, 546). Predicting the degree
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of scrutiny may become more difficult to the extent that a case features
factors that augur both for stepped-up and stepped-down scrutiny—
say, a broadly discretionary policy choice that allegedly violates a right
(Craig and De Búrca 2011, 546).
Varying the level of scrutiny with the case characteristics is a way the
proportionality framework can be made to respect a number of values
relevant to the administrative process or policy goals. For instance, in
Japan, courts apply a notably deferential version of proportionalitystyle review to administrative decisions not to act (Chikushi 2013). This
directional deference—more pronounced towards agency inaction
than action—reflects a sensitivity to the administration’s inherent
advantage, relative to courts, in setting regulatory and enforcement
priorities. EU courts make room for the precautionary principle in
proportionality review insofar as it touches on the regulation of risk, by
reviewing aggressive measures to reduce risks of serious harm with a
fairly light touch (Craig 2006, 662).
3.3 Discursiveness of Analysis
Jurisdictions also differ in the extent to which courts use proportionality
review to structure an in-depth discourse on the challenged measure.
Proportionality offers a framework that courts can use to engage in
detail and at length with the merits and faults of a measure, as put
before the court by the contending parties. In working their way
through the proportionality subtests, courts can build a reasoned
justification for their rulings, acknowledging the competing interests
on either side and explaining why, ultimately, one side prevails. (Stone
Sweet and Mathews 2008, 89). But proportionality review is not
always and everywhere employed so discursively. At the other
extreme, courts can make bare assertions that measures are
proportionate, or reward measures that survive some other kind of
review with that label (Lin 2013, 14, 18-20).
There may be a connection between the intensity and discursiveness
of a court’s proportionality review. As described above, courts can
moderate the intensity of review by shedding stages of the analysis or
compressing them into a less invasive “reasonableness” review. But
lowering the intensity of proportionality review does not necessarily
entail sacrificing a deliberative, detailed evaluation of the competing
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claims or a well-justified conclusion. As Paul Craig notes, even when
they review measures under the fairly deferential “manifest
disproportionality” approach, the Courts of the EU nonetheless engage
in thorough, reasoned evaluation of the measures before them (Craig
2006, 670). What would be surprising, on the other hand, would be
for a court to reject a measure as disproportionate, without justifying
that outcome by amply demonstrating the course of reasoning that led
it to that conclusion—including, for instance, by pointing to less
infringing alternatives the government could have chosen.
Existing national norms of judicial practice will certainly shape how
courts present their proportionality analysis, but proportionality itself
may have some impact on judicial culture. France is an interesting case
in point. Ruling from France’s high courts tend to be short and
syllogistic, presenting their conclusions as the inevitable results of
inexorable operations of deductive logic (Lasser 2005, 34).
Structurally, the decisions consist of a series of “Whereas” clauses,
terminating in an announcement of the court’s judgment. It is not that
French courts do not engage in wide-ranging deliberations about the
cases that they hear. They do, but these are typically conducted in
ancillary documents that do not form a part of their published
decisions (Lasser 2005, 47-60). The analysis in the decision itself may
be skeletal in the extreme. France’s Constitutional Council, for
instance, often concludes in a single sentence that a challenged
measure is necessary, adequate, and proportionate (Sanchez 2016,
44).16
Still, the French administrative courts have shown that they can engage
in a form of proportionality formula even within the confines of the
syllogistic formula. They can do so by shoehorning the case-specific
circumstances that guide their evaluation of a challenged measure’s fit
into that formula. In an unpublished decision from early 2016, for
instance, the Conseil d’Etat reviewed a challenge, on proportionality
and other grounds, to a police order ordering the eviction of all those
camped on public lands in a suburb of Paris within 48 hours.17 The
Conseil disposed of the proportionality challenge in a long “Whereas”
clause, the longest of the decision by far, that noted the dramatic recent
increase in the encampments’ population, uncontroverted police
reports noting unsafe and unsanitary conditions in the camps, and the
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city’s provision of emergency housing for the camp’s residents before
concluding that there was no “manifest breach of the conditions of
necessity and proportionality.”
Germany makes for an interesting comparison with France. German
administrative court decisions can be exercises in sustained
justification, with detailed consideration given to the relevant law and
facts before the court. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find fairly indepth proportionality analyses in German administrative caselaw.18
But notably, the courts do not engage in detailed analysis in all cases
where the pass on the proportionality of a challenged measure. In
circumstances where proportionality is not one of the major issues or
the case, or the question is not a close one, German courts can also
dispense with proportionality arguments quite briskly.19
There may be some jurisdictions in which a conclusion that a measure
is proportionate is sometimes little more than a naked assertion not
fortified by further reasons. Writing about Taiwan, for instance, and
specifically with reference to environmental litigation, Chun-Yuan Lin
has characterized proportionality as a “meaninglessly mentioned
principle” (2013, 13).
Wherever courts conduct proportionality review, they of course do so
against a backdrop of system-specific norms about the form of judicial
decisions. But it is notable that, even given these differences, courts in
different jurisdictions find the latitude to expand or contract the
discursiveness of proportionality analysis, as they deem the
circumstances of a case to demand.

4. Assessment
4.1 Patterns
Broadly surveying the use of proportionality review in administrative
law across jurisdictions, the first impression is one of a great diversity
of approaches, across a number of dimensions: in terms of when, how,
and how stringently the review is conducted. And to be sure, there are
some pronounced national differences. And of course, there are many
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systems that do not recognize proportionality as a head of review at all
(even if, in some cases, they have doctrines that approximate
proportionality review in some respects (Mathews 2016)).
But a closer look reveals that there are substantial variations within
legal systems as to how proportionality review is conducted in different
circumstances. And at least some of the variation, within and across
systems, begins to resolve itself into some broad patterns. In the space
remaining, I will describe some of the patterns, and conclude with
some comments about what this suggests about the role of
proportionality in public law more generally.
4.1.a Extensiveness
Systems vary with respect to how extensively they employ
proportionality review. In some jurisdictions, proportionality is
wheeled out for use in a discrete set of contexts only, whereas in
others, proportionality is recognized as a constitutional principle or
general principle of law. But even in systems where proportionality in
principle applies across the board, in practice it does not dominate
administrative litigation, since other normative controls over
administrative power are also in place. Regardless of the formal status
of proportionality principle, there are some “usual suspects”: legal
contexts in which proportionality frequently turns up, wherever else it
might appear. These include the review of administrative penalties,
and administrative actions that implicate rights or other sensitive
individual interests.
It makes sense that these would be areas of law where the use of
proportionality is prominent. These are areas in which the stakes of
government overreaching are especially palpable, because individuals
are directly and adversely affected in salient ways. Under these
circumstances, the appeal of a formula for review that blocks
inappropriately far-reaching measures is intuitive and powerful.
The use of proportionality has expanded outward over time, both
across legal systems, and within legal systems. There are reasons that
favor proportionality’s spread, but also factors that may check the
breadth of its adoption to a greater or lesser degree in different legal
systems. There are both strategic and normative logics to
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proportionality’s spread (Stone Sweet and Mathews 2008). For judges,
proportionality review offers a useful and flexible set of tools for
managing
difficult
dispute-resolution
environments.
The
proportionality framework offers a court an opportunity to
acknowledge the validity of the competing interests on either side of a
dispute and to justify its own decision with reference to the particular
circumstances of the case.
What is more, proportionality is subject to a kind of hydraulic
normative logic. Once courts declare that some administrative uses of
discretion should be reviewed from proportionality, declining to
extend proportionality review to other discretionary choices is
tantamount to conceding that disproportionate actions are permissible
some of the time. Courts may find it difficult to justify that result
(although the task may be easier to the extent courts can rely on wellestablished doctrines curtailing the scope of review).
At the same time, national differences of several kinds stand in the way
of anything like a convergence with respect to the scope of
proportionality’s application. Administrative law doctrines that are
already in place will shape how proportionality is received in a legal
system. More broadly still, structural features in administrative law
systems determine what kinds of administrative decisions are in
principle subject to judicial review, and may exclude important classes
of decisions.20
Moreover, both formal and functional differences in the scope of
judicial review and the role of courts vis-à-vis the administration can
condition how extensively proportionality is used. Systems with strong
norms against substituting judgment may be especially resistant to the
use of anything like proportionality to review policy-sensitive
judgments thought to lie within the administration’s expertise. And
courts that lack meaningful independence may be in a poor position
to review the proportionality of high-stakes, politically salient choices.
It would be surprising, for instance, to find courts in China exerting
meaningful proportionality review over eminent domain decisions, as
we see in France, given the limited independence that Chinese courts
enjoy as a practical matter.21
4.1.b Intensity
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Some patterns also emerge with respect to the intensity of
proportionality review. To be sure, there is a considerable amount of
residual variability as well, with the stringency of review varying for
idiosyncratic reasons in some contexts. But in systems where
proportionality is well-established, we see courts calibrating the
intensity of review to the circumstances of the litigation, according to
more-or-less explicit and intelligible formulas. Courts tend to be more
deferential to the decision maker’s choice of measure to the extent that
those choices implicate policy judgments, or administrative expertise,
or the management of risk. Courts are more likely to apply
proportionality full strength to the extent that the measures under
review threaten harm to individual rights or other favored interests.
In fact, it may that having some rubric for varying the intensity of
review is necessary if proportionality is to become a prominent feature
in a jurisdiction’s administrative law. Applied most strictly,
proportionality review leaves no room for deference to the judgments
of primary decision makers. But this most demanding form of review
will be a non-starter in contexts in which those judgments are deemed
to deserve at least some weight. On the other hand, varying the
intensity of review on a purely ad hoc basis opens courts to charges of
unpredictability and arbitrariness.
Accordingly, it makes sense that systems in which proportionality is
prominent typically devise some framework to regularize how the
intensity of review varies. The amount of attention given to the
problem of controlling the variable intensity of review within a legal
system may be one indicator that the system is reaching the saturation
point with respect to proportionality.
4.1.c Discursiveness
There also appear some underlying regularities to variations in
the discursiveness of proportionality review. Proportionality can
function as a justification structure courts can use to justify their rulings
through systematic, reasoned appraisal of the challenged measures.
The norms of judicial decision-writing may be more or less congenial
to this use of proportionality in different systems, and the importance
of reason-giving may vary as well.
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The extent to which courts use proportionality review as an
opportunity to ventilate, in their written decisions, the appropriateness
of a challenged measure will obviously differ depending on these
system-specific features. But two further points are worth noting. First,
even in systems where stripped-down, syllogistic decisions are the
norm, courts can still find room for a proportionality analysis that
shows off how the court carefully tested the challenged measure’s fit.
And second, courts across systems can expand and contract
proportionality review like an accordion, depending on how much
justification the court deems its conclusion to require.
4.2 Proportionality’s Place in Public Law
If the brief survey above demonstrates anything, it is that
proportionality review is readily adaptable to a host of different
circumstances. Courts can dispense with elements of the standard
model and conduct review more or less stringently, while still retaining
the core idea of an appropriate relationship between means and ends.
But if proportionality’s protean character is one of the secrets of its
success, it is not the only one. The widespread adoption of
proportionality review within administrative law systems also reflects
the normative attractiveness of the proportionality ideal as a
benchmark for judging state behavior. As described above, Prussian
police law scholars articulated a legitimating logic for proportionality
that reduces to two key propositions: first, that what legitimates the use
of public power is the pursuit of public purposes, and second, its
corollary, that exercises of public power should extend no further than
those purposes require. These propositions continue to resonate,
including in modern liberal democracies, and can justify the use of
proportionality to test government measures that constrain private
liberties.
While the adjudication of constitutional rights claims and the review
of administrative discretion typically occur within separate doctrinal
boxes, this rationale for proportionality applies in principle to both.
And in systems where the use of proportionality is well-developed, the
distinction between proportionality as a principle of constitutional law
and as a principle of administrative law can erode. The paradigmatic
example is Germany, where the constitutional proportionality
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principle has essentially absorbed the proportionality principle
anchored in police law.
When proportionality makes frequent appearances in both
constitutional and administrative contexts, it begins to look more like
a general organizing framework for the review of government
measures. On this view, constitutional rights claims are distinctive in
that they are the basis for challenge to a wider range of government
actions (for instance, to legislative as well as administrative action) and
because they trigger particularly searching review. But, from this
perspective, they can be regarded essentially as special manifestations
of a more general government obligation to act proportionately.
Courts and other institutions face decisions that will determine whether
and to what extent their legal systems embrace proportionality as a sort
of master concept of public law. These questions are already coming
up. For instance, in Canada, the issue of proportionality’s scope and
how it bears on the relation between constitutional law and
administrative law has arisen in a number of cases in recent years,
which have divided its Supreme Court (Walters 2015).22 Rejecting
some calls for a broader rapprochement between constitutional law
and administrative law, the Court has most recently adopted the
position that proportionality does not apply as such to reviews of
administrative discretion, but does inform the administrative law
reasonableness analysis, insofar as administrative measures implicate
the values of Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms.23
The Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions serve as a reminder that the
place of proportionality in public law remains contested in many
systems. While some functional and normative logics augur in favor of
generalizing proportionality into a kind of all-purpose criterion of legal
legitimacy, a broad set of countervailing factors generate significant
and enduring cross-national variations in when and how
proportionality review is actually conducted.
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